majority in the parliament. The idea of a president from AKP triggered a reaction among secular groups on the ground that a president from AKP could be the symbol of islamization of state institutions and would damage Turkey by introducing islamic values into the secular Kemalist state. Mass meetings of secular groups came together in big cities to convey a message that AKP would have to search for consensus over the presidency rather than using its parliamentary dominance. Not only secular groups but also the military was included in sending out messages to AKP. On 12 April 2007, the Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt stated that the armed forces was hoping the next president would be someone who would commit himself to the fundamental values of the republic including secularism, not only in words but also in substance at a conference. (Note 4) Because of the harsh reactions of the secular elites including senior army generals, AKP did not nominate the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the presidential candidate, but instead Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that moment, was nominated. (Note 5) Gül's candidacy did not appease secular forces as well, since he was connected with the Islamist "National Outlook Movement" and his headscarf wearing wife (Note 6) was also considered as an indicator of Gül's anti-secular worldview; however AKP still preserved Gül's candidacy. The first round of the presidential election was held on 27 April 2007; Gül could not acquire the support of the qualified majority of deputies. According to the article 102 of Turkish Constitution before it was amended (Note 7) the President of the Republic shall be elected by a two-thirds majority of the total number of members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and by secret ballot; if a two-thirds majority of the total number of members (367 deputies) can not be obtained in the first two ballots, between which there shall be at least a three-day interval, a third ballot shall be held and the candidate who receives the absolute majority of votes of the total number of members should be elected President of the Republic.
After the first round, the main opposition party, Republican People's Party (CHP), applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the ballot on the ground that the required quorum had not been present. According to the article 96 of the Constitution, the Assembly shall convene with at least one third of the total number of members, unless otherwise stipulated in the Constitution. (Note 8) CHP considered the election of the president as one of the exceptions stated on article 96 of the Constitution. According to CHP, the article 102 of the Constitution implied that a two-thirds majority of the total number of the members of Assembly were supposed to be present in the session of presidential election.
The most surprising event however, was a harsh declaration on the On April 30, 2007 the Constitutional Court declared its decision and determined that 367 deputies must be present for the first two rounds of the presidential ballot when electing the president. (Note 10) On May 6, 2007 the Turkish Assembly could not elect the president once again, because the required quorum which was stated by the Constitutional Court was not acquired. Since the Assembly had failed to elect a new president, early elections came into question. (Note 11) Meanwhile, AKP proposed a package of constitutional amnedments including the introduction of the popular election of the president, the reduction of the president's term of office from 7 years to 5 years, the reduction of parliament's term of office from 5 to 4 years and a clarification of the quorum of the Assembly. After the amnedments were passed by the Assembly, President Sezer returned them to the Assembly; however they were readopted. (Note 12) On June 18, 2007 Sezer signed the amendments for publication in the Official Gazette and submitted them to a referendum. He also applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the package of amendments, but this time Constitutional Court rejected the application. (Note 13) The amendments were approved by a referendum. (Note 14) On 22.07.2007, early general elections were held and AKP won 46.5% of the votes. On 14.08.2007 Abdullah Gül redeclared his candidacy. This time, AKP was more powerful and event though CHP members did not attend the session for the election of president, the Assembly was able to acquire the required two-thirds majority to convene and Abdullah Gül was elected as the president of Turkey on August 28, 2007.
As can be seen, Parliament's failure to elect a new president, Constitutional Court's controversial decision and military interventions into political process, deepened the tension between AKP and the secular elite. So, one may assert that the adoption of the principle of popular election of the president which has changed the governmental system from parliamentary system to parliamentary with president system involved in the amendment package as a reaction to the political crisis during the election of the president and it was not the consequence of a well judged constitutional step. According to our opinion, even if the amendment which changed the Turkish Governmental System was accepted as part of a well thought out constitutional engineering design, it might still create serious problems in the future.
Before starting to state these prospective problems, it would be appropriate to define parliamentary with president system in general. In this system, the executive authority is completely dependent upon parliamentary confidence and the president is elected by the people but his legislative (Note 15), appointive and emergency powers are much more limited than the powers of a president serving under presidential or semi presidential constitution. Even though it has similar characteristics with a parliamentary system (Note 16), it can not be accepted as a type of parliamentary system since the president in this system is elected by the people. (Note 17) The problems that might occur from the new governmental system are underlined by some academicians. (Gönenç, 2007, p.39-43) According to their evaluation whom we also agree with, in a parliamentary with president system, not only the political party which competes with the others to have seats in the parliament and achieves majority in the parliament and controls the government after the competition, but also the president puts forward a political program and makes promises, do propogandize during the campaign in order to get elected. When the president, government and the majority of the parliament share the same worldview, these actors cooperate with each other to implement the same political program presumably; however this may hamper the impartiality of the president in favour of the ruling worldview. On the contrary, when these actors have different worldviews, in this case the principle of the unity of the political program is out of question. Both the president and the ruling political party put forward different political programs and the activities that they promised to fulfill whenever they come into power reflect different worldviews. The competing political parties can use the majority of the parliament and government authority in order to fulfill their political programs whenever they come into power, but how is a president in a parliamentary with president system able to fulfill his promises when he is elected? As underlined above, in a parliamentary with president system, the president holds highly limited powers even though he is elected by the people. In such a system, the legislative authority of the president should be increased, at least the power of proposing bills should be given to the president. The right to legislative initiation potentially strengthens the president's control over policy issues. Otherwise the president may enforce his constitutional authorities in order to fulfill his electoral promises. Moreover, a president who would like to fulfill his promises may put aside his impartiality. In other words, the president may be in need of seeking support in the parliament or he may tend to make an alliance with political parties in order to fulfill his electoral promises. In fact, the president may even cooperate with the opposition party in order to dismiss the government which does not share the same worldview with himself. It is not difficult to predict how such tendencies could damage the impartiality of the president. Above all, the competing political programs may cause a legitimacy crisis. In a parliamentary with president system, both the president and the legislature are directly elected by people and thus have separate sources of legitimacy; so there is always the possibility of deadlock and political paralysis when these actors have different worldviews and different political programs. (Gönenç, 2007, p.39-43) In brief, the new system in Turkey may cause considerable problems in the future, specifically when the president and government-parliament majority have different worldviews.
Is Parliamentary with President System the Final Choice for Turkey?
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the parliamentary with president system is being considered as a step to pass through a semi-presidential or a presidential system in Turkey, so the new governmental system probably will not be the last experience for Turkey, however it should be remembered that similar problems can arise from semi-presidential and presidential systems in the long run, if they are adopted in Turkey.
In a common way semi-presidentialism is defined as a situation where there is a directly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to the legislature. (Elgie, 2005, p.98-112; Skach, 2005; Shugart, 2005, p.323-351 ) (Note 18) There is a widespread consensus that the direct election of the president can encourage the personalization of the political process and encourage the president to ignore any opposition. Linz argues that semi-presidentialism in which the president has considerable powers can turn to "a constitutional dictatorship" (Linz, 1994, p. 48) When we consider the constitutional history of Turkey, we can clearly see that its presidents have always been stronger than presidents in the classical parliamentary systems. By referring to this consideration, it can be asserted that a Turkish president serving under a semi-presidential constitution presumably would have quite considerable powers and the combination of a president with strong constitutional powers supported by a parliament majority and a prime minister could encourage the president to ignore the rule of law. As Lijphart points out, semi presidential systems "actually make it possible for the president to be even more powerful than in most pure presidential systems". (Lijphart, 2004, p.102) When the majority in the parliament is opposed to the president, in other words, when the president and the parliamentary majority have different worldviews, there is always a probability of controversy between these actors. Supposing that neither the president, nor the prime minister is willing to compromise, in this case a deadlock of the political system is inevitable. The problem of a divided executive defined as cohabitation, is the most well known argument against semi presidential system. The only instrument to overcome the cohabitation is compromising; however it is indeed uneasy to overcome such a gridlock for the countries that lack the culture of compromise. For example, such a cohabitation situation ended up with a military intervention in Chile in 1973. According to Faundez, in the event, government and opposition did not agree and as the political confrontation became more acute, with the government refusing to revoke its administrative orders and the opposition demanding the resignation of Allende, the military finally stepped in and staged a coup that brought down the popular Unity Government and democracy. (Faundez, 1997, p.317) Divided minority government in which neither the president, nor the prime minister, nor any party or coalition, enjoys a substantive majority in the legislature, is identified as another argument against semi-presidentialism" (Skach, 2005, p. 15) It is alleged that this situation can predictably lead to an unstable scenario, characterized by shifting legislative coalitions and government reshuffles, on the one hand, and continuous presidential intervention and use of reserved powers, on the other (Skach, 2005, p.17-18) When the executive is weakened, because of the absence of a stable parliamentary majority, directly elected presidents may assert their power over the system and this weakens the democratization process. (Skach, 2005, p.18) Both the arguments against semi-presidentialism in the name of dual legitimacy and over presidentialization are similar to criticisms of presidentialism. In presidential systems a president with considerable constitutional powers is directly elected by the people for a fixed term and is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence. The president is not only the holder of executive power but also the symbolic head of state and can be removed between elections only by impeachment. (Note 19) In presidential systems since both the president and legislature "derive their power from the vote of the people in a free competition among well defined alternatives, a conflict is always latent and sometimes likely to erupt dramatically; there is no democratic principle to resolve it" (Linz, 1994, p.7) . In regard to over presidentialization, the perception of being of the representative of the whole nation may encourage the president to ignore the opposition. This argument is stressed as "The feeling of having independent power, a mandate from the people ... is likely to give a president a sense of power and mission that might be out of proportion to the limited plurality that elected him. This in turn might make resistances he encounters . . . more frustrating, demoralizing, or irritating than resistances usually are for a prime minister." (Linz, 1994, p.19) The rigidity of presidentialism, created by the fixed term of office which can be a liability is accepted as another argument against presidential system. This argument is also emphasized as "entails a rigidity . . . that makes adjustment to changing situations extremely difficult; a leader who has lost the confidence of his own party or the parties that acquiesced in his election cannot be replaced." (Linz, 1994, p. 9-10) Among these arguments against presidentialism, maybe the most criticisized one is "zero sum presidential elections". According to Linz, presidentialism is ineluctably problematic because it operates according to the rule of "winner-take-all", an arrangement that tends to make democratic politics a zero-sum game, with all the potential for conflict such games portend. (Linz, 1990, p.56) It is stated that in the American Presidential electoral process, the laws governing the selection of presidential electors in the States generally provide for the winner-take-all principle. This means that the winner of the popular vote in a State is usually awarded the votes of all of the electors that are allocated to that particular State. Consequently, even in a normal presidential election, the winner-take-all scheme can produce a substantial disparity between the popular vote and the electoral college vote. This has in fact happened. Indeed, it happened in the 2000 Presidential Election. Gore, the winner of the nationwide popular vote, failed in the end to gain a majority of the electoral college vote. (Tillers, 2002, p.50) Linz underlines the danger of zero-sum presidential elections as "The danger that zero-sum presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the president's fixed term in office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the presidential mandate. There is no hope for shifts in alliances, expansion of the government's base of support through national-unity or emergency grand coalitions, new elections in response to major new events, and so on. Instead, the losers must wait at least four or five years without any access to executive power and patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization." (Linz, 1990, p.56) If, in ethnically divided societies, a president belongs to one ethnic group, then the situation will be more hazardous. Ethnically divided societies need peaceful coexistence among contending groups. This requires compromise and conciliation. For that reason, it is absolutely necessary for representatives of these groups to be included in the decision -making process. However, in presidential systems, because of the rule of "winner -take -all," consensus and power -sharing mechanisms cannot work. (Lijphart, 1991, p.81) When we consider the evaluations about semi-presidential and presidential systems above, the whole picture shows us that the systems in question may not be the appropriate options for Turkey as well as parliamentary with president system. First of all, it must be underlined that "a popularly elected president" can bring serious problems for Turkey in the long run. In the Ottoman Empire individuals lived in a society in which the Sultan had absolute powers with no tradition concerning the limitation of political power. During modern Turkish period, presidents have always been stronger than presidents in the classical parliamentary systems. As Heper states, the parliamentary system of government with a more than symbolic president proved to be rather problematic in Turkey. Turkish political actors could not appreciate the need for this type of political structuring. Özal and Demirel presidencies constituted the real test cases for the operation of parliamentarism with a more than symbolic presidency. Especially, ex-president Özal wanted to dominate the political system and resorted to a one-man show. As the nominal head of executive, he attempted to dictate policies to governments. His activist approach created tensions in the polity. (Heper, 1996, p.501-502) By considering the constitutional history of Turkey, it is not very difficult to predict what will happen when the president is elected popularly and represents the same majority in the legislature. In this situation the fundamental rights of the individuals will be in jeopardy. When the president lacks a parliamentary majority, then the conflict between the legislature and the executive will be more grave because of the absence of tradition of compromise and conciliation.
The reason why the governmental system in Turkey needed to be changed from parliamentary system to semi presidential or presidential system has been explained by the arguments of "instability" and "inefficiency" of Turkish parliamentarism. According to these arguments, Turkey has been administered by unstable and ineffective coalition governments for years; however only stable and effective governments can certainly ease the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.
The negative sides of Turkish parliamentarism can not be avoided; however in our opinion, it would have been more appropriate to rationalize Turkish parliamentarism with efficient institutional remedies than to adopt a new governmental system which is unfamiliar to Turkish constitutional experience.
Rationalized Parliamentarism: An Ignored Remedy for Turkey?
What could have been done in order to eliminate negative sides of Turkish parliamentarism? It is emphasized that, the fact that cabinets depend on majority support in parliament and can be dismissed by parliamentary votes of no-confidence may lead to cabinet instability and as a result, regime instability. The position of cabinets vis-a-vis legislatures can be strengthened by constitutional provisions designed to this effect. One such provision is the constructive vote of no confidence, adopted in the 1949 constitution of West Germany, which stipulates that the prime minister (chancellor) can be dismissed by parliament only if a new prime minister is elected simultaneously. This eliminates the risk of a cabinet being voted out of office by a "negative" legislative majority that is unable to form an alternative cabinet. (Lijphart, 2004, p.103) According to the article 67 of Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, no chancellor may be removed unless a majority is able to name a successor. In our opinion, the adoption of the constructive no-confidence vote (Note 20) which can be accepted as the most effective rationalized parliamentarism (Note 21) device could have been put into effect in Turkey in order to reduce the possibility of potential governmental instability. (Note 22) The Turkish Constitution of 1982 empowers the president to call new elections under two circumstances: l. In cases where the Council of Ministers fails to receive a vote of confidence or is compelled to resign by a vote of no confidence, and if a new Council of Ministers can not be formed within forty-five days or the new Council of Ministers fails to receive a vote of confidence; 2. If a new Council of Ministers can not be formed within forty-five days after the resignation of the Prime Minister without having been defeated by a vote of confidence, or within forty-five days of the elections for the Bureau of the Speaker of the newly elected Assembly. In either case, the President, after consultation with the Speaker of the Assembly, may call new elections (Article 116). The power thus granted to the President aims to ensure governmental stability; however, in our opinion if the time period of 45 days had been reduced, a cabinet crisis could have been resolved in shorter time and the governmental stability could have been preserved in this way. (Onar, 2005, p.103) As mentioned before, in the Turkish parliamentary government system the presidents appear stronger and more active than the presidents in classical parliamentary systems. It is stated that, not only the inherent logic of Turkish Constitutions, but also environmental factors and the personalities of the presidents contributed to making the president relatively strong. (Gönenç, 2008, p. 503) The power of presidents has been discussed and criticized under various circumstances in Turkey. Even Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was the most active president in the Turkish constitutional history in terms of using his constitutional powers (Note 23), stated that the powers given to the president by Article 104 far exceed the limits of a parliamentary democracy. Yet, it is unacceptable for an unaccountable president, from outside parliament, which represents the will of the nation, to share in running the country and to use special powers by himself. (Note 24) Sezer's term of presidency was full of political crises. The crises during the coalition governments triggered the governmental instability in Turkey. As an efficient remedy, the powers given to the president by article 104 of the Turkish Constitution of 1982 could have been limited in order to be compatible with parliamentary systems. Such an arrangement could also have reduced the possibility of potential governmental instability. (Onar, 2005, p.103) The issue of European Union Membership is undoubtly one of Turkey's most important foreign policy problems. Turkey was officially recognized as an EU candidate in December 1999, and in December 2002 the European Council announced that if Turkey met its political 'Copenhagen' criteria by the end of 2004 it would open negotiations without delay. Since 1999, and particularly since the election of the AKP government in November 2002, there has been radical and rapid political reform in Turkey. European Union's assessments and reactions concerning a governmental system change in Turkey must be considered by Turkish political actors as well. Among the members of the Union, parliamentary system is accepted as the main governmental system. European Union's historical background, socio-economic and cultural structure makes it impossible to adopt presidential system, while semi-presidential system can be seen as an exception. However, the members which have adopted semi-presidential systems come face to face with serious political problems too often. (Elgie, 1999, p.26) When the constitutional history of Turkey is taken into consideration, it can easily be asserted that, the amendment changed the Turkish Governmental System from parliamentary system to parliamentary with "president" system by introducing the principle of "popular election of the president", will probably be critized, at least it will not be welcomed by European Union in the long run.
Conclusion
Governmental system change can not be seen only as a Constitutional Law issue. It would be inappropriate to discuss such a change without considering its effects on the whole legal system. According to Kelsen's theory, a legal system is made of a hierarchy of norms. Each norm is derived from its superior norm. (Kelsen, 1967; Marty, 2002, p.57) A norm change on the top of the pyramid definitely effects the norms at the bottom. In a similar vein, Krasner states that institutionalization can be conceived of along two dimensions, breadth and depth. Breadth refers to the number of links an institution has. Horizontal linkage refers to the density of links between a particular activity and other activities. If a particular activity is densely linked, then one modification requires changes in many others. (Krasner, 1988, p.75-76) In the light of these theoretical expansions, it may be accepted that, when a change occurs in the governmental system, the whole legal system should be reviewed and a platform which is adaptable to the new system should be built momentously. However, when the amendment process in Turkey is considered, it can be clearly recognized that neither the constitutional system was revised nor a platform which is adaptable to the new governmental system was built before the last constitutional amendment, that changed the governmental system, was accepted.
Lindner indicates that, the political costs of institutional reform (switching costs) plays an important role in stabilizing the existing institutional path. Even though actors accept that reform is necessary, the switching costs and the uncertainty over the gains from a new system (opportunity cost) prevents change. (Lindner, 2003, p.924; Pierson, 2000, p.251-267) This particular point was also not considered by political actors in Turkey during the amendment process, therefore, if the political costs of the governmental system change in Turkey exceeded the gains from the new governmental system, this would not be surprising.
As Lipset has pointed out, it is difficult, if not impossible, to change cu1ture. Historical legacies do not disappear overnight. Nevertheless, it is much easier to modify political institutions than adopt a new system. (Lipset, 1990, p.83) So, ignoring the devices to rationalize Turkish parliamentarism and adopting a new governmental system by introducing the principle of "popular election of the president" which might bring serious problems in the future may be the biggest regret of Turkish political actors in the long run.
